Bilateral ties between the United States and Pakistan have suffered many ups and downs in the last 77 years. However, the sure thing is that the strategic location of Pakistan, which has allowed it to be a frontline state for the USA. During the Cold War, as a member of the Organization of the Treaty of Southeast Asia and the Baghdad Pact block, it was integrated into the order led by the United States, benefiting from the latter’s diplomatic and military support. Pakistan’s centrality increased during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, decreasing after the end of the cold war, and reached its peak during the United States War against terror. And although the Trump administration faced a uphill with Imran Khan, the United States and Pakistan committed themselves closely to facilitate the withdrawal of the American troops of Afghanistan.
New World Chang
However, both the United States and Pakistan have changed since Trump’s last period. Trump has returned with a massive mandate, but he is aging and will fulfill his last period in office, more taxed in legacy considerations. The United States is polarized unprecedented in all failures of ethnicity, race, sex, class and political ideology.
Pakistan politics is transient. But as it may, the hybrid order seems to be the dominant context, against which politicians will push for the influence and favors of Rawalpindi. The hybrid order, however, has little popular legitimacy. The loss of popular consent and accusations of manipulating the results of the national elections in 2024, together with the continuous economic crisis of the country and the imprisonment of Imran Khan, as the most popular leader of Pakistan, have strengthened the forces of secession and sectarians , with some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like Some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like some, like the Tehreek-I -Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Baloch Liberation Army (Bla), actively colluding.
Biggs’s great proposal
Given these challenges, the legislative proposal of Representative Andy Biggs of Arizona to end Pakistan’s designation as an important NATO ally could not have arrived at worse. Biggs is a vocal member of Freedom Caucus, a faction of extreme right, fiscally conservative and spiritually Trumpia of the Great Old Party (Republican Party), known for its opposition to the central elements of the right of the party. While the positions of Caucus Freedom could have looked beyond the Overton window, Trump’s return and his decision to withdraw the United States from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Paris Climate Pact, in addition to duplicating Its hard line posture about immigration, have confirmed what can be the new normality in the coming years?
However, it is unlikely that Pakistan or his status as an important ally that is not from NATO appears a lot on Trump’s foreign policy agenda. His executive orders on the setback on the multilateral commitments of the USA and the amendment of the base of US citizenship suggest that their agenda will probably revolve around key electoral planks such as immigration and geoeconomic competence with China. Pakistan’s primacy in the American calculation decreases precipitously in the absence of a conflict in southern Asia, one that is of interest to Americans. Whatever the small commitment that the Trump administration enjoyed with the Imran Khan regime, it rarely extended beyond the facilitation of the American withdrawal of Afghanistan. Trump and their appointed will not like the deployment of US assets in peripheral conflicts to US interests and, due to the sectarian conflict in Pakistan and the resumption of terrorist activity by TTP and Bla, will avoid increasing its association with the country.
The signals were there
Not gathering or talking with Imran Khan and Shehbaz Sharif, the White House effectively degraded the state of Pakistan during the presidency of Joe Biden. Although this also has to do with the support of the Democrats to Israel in the Israel-Gaza War, the reception of Imran Khan of Donald Trump in 2019, as well as the links promoted by the Pakistan Tehreek-E-Insaf (PTI) With the Pakistani diaspora, he had attracted the latter to Trump. His belief in Trump to support vocally and generate pressure on the Pakistani establishment to free Khan was strengthened by Richard Grenelll’s support for him. However, now, as a special envoy for special operations, it is unlikely that Grenelll has a lot of influence on Trump’s policy towards Pakistan, or even in Asia del Sur, in general.
The Pakistani diaspora of 6,80,000 people in the United States and PTI supporters conveniently forget Trump’s frequent comments against Pakistan and his designation as a “country of particular concern”, and also that he suspended military aid worth $ 1.3 one billion in 2018. Grenelll. However, Trump, in the true populist fashion, will exercise a highly centralist and personalist foreign policy, without mitigating the concerns of the Convention and the need to make deliberative decisions. This implies that Trump’s policies towards any country, Pakistan in this case, will be predominantly dictated by personal prejudices and beliefs and their relationship with their counterparts.
Limited contact
The United States and Pakistan continue to pursue a strategic association, oriented towards defense and exchange of intelligence, although with reduced bets. The United States central command commander, Michael E. Kurilla, visited Islamabad in 2022 and 2024, reaffirming the United States-Pakistan Security Association. And while the general also visited the United States in 2023 and met with the United States Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, the trip came after having been in office for a year. Under Biden, United States, trying to reorient the focus of relations between the two countries with human security, had begun a “health dialogue” and invested $ 23.5 million in the electricity sector. The United States was one of the first responders of cataclysmic floods in Pakistan in 2022, forming the green alliance and a bilateral working group on climate, in addition to extending $ 30 million in critical humanitarian aid and the support of the allies.
Hunting towards China
Trump’s climate skepticism and the transactional vision of world affairs will imply an immediate cessation of this non -strategic dimension of their association. The reduction of strategic bets, together with the end of humanitarian and economic assistance, can further deepen the confidence deficit between the United States and Pakistan. Trump’s simplistic understanding of international relations builds a binary manichaean between the United States and China, and any Pakistan attempt to approach China to achieve its objectives will not sit well with the White House.
The jury is still outside the impact of Trump’s return on American ties with his partners, but his actions in the first week confirm fears on the reduction of the United States by the global order and the resurgence of transactional foreign policy. In the eyes of Washington, the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan did not undo Pakistan of the country’s affairs; Rather, the status of Pakistan decreased. It is unlikely that Pakistan appears prominently in American foreign policy in Trump 2.0, bringing, as he does, little to the table for the United States. Trump will be concerned with the strengthening of his alliance with the Gulf monarchs, as well as the Indo-Pacific leaders to counteract China.
Unless the situation in Pakistan raises a threat to American interests, the efforts to exchange intelligence and anti-terrorism of the United States-Pakistan will be relegated to the rear burner. In this situation, Pakistan can car more behind China, enraging the Trump administration and setting the harmful forces for their bilateral ties.
(Parth Seth is a researcher at the India Foundation. Study southern Asia and the Middle East, and North Africa. The opinions expressed here do not represent those of their organization).
Discharge of responsibility: These are the author’s personal opinions
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